breaches occur, and oblige shamed parties to effect redress if none is forthcoming. The pur pose or function of any given piece of mun dane ceremony, however, can be understood only in terms of the consequences it has for social interchange and, often, that under standing is had best either in the normative breach or nonoccurrence.
The second component of the interactional context is the participation framework, which refers to everyone within the perceptual range of a mentionable event. Participants may be there as ratified or designated receivers, may overhear transmissions slated for others, or may simply be welcome bystanders. Whatever the participation status, its occupant will be constrained to display conduct appropriate to it.
The third component is embedding, which refers to who or, in whose name, someone is "speaking." Is the person who is speaking the author, subject, object, or principal of the words being spoken? Is a person speaking for herself or himself in the here and now? Re calling what she herself or he himself said elsewhere? Rehearsing what she or he intends to say later? Recounting what someone else says she or he said? Delivering something al ready memorized? Reading from a text some one else prepared? Or, speaking spontane ously?
The empirical concretization of these ana lytically separable components may be under stood as comprising the interactional context and, when activated in communication, may be seized in a unit of analysis called the "mentionable event" or "ritual interchange." Any mentionable event, accordingly, will be constrained by an interactional context and thereby carry an etiquette of encounter, the rights, privileges, duties, and obligations of those who encounter, and the organization of who speaks for whom and how. Note well, then, that the components of the interactional context always are matters of local custom, which means that all mentionable events are culture bound.
The big question is: Can we adduce a small, finite set of contexts (or frames of reference) whose logical combination and permutation can be shown to constrain an infinite number of interpretations, reinterpretations, and re constructions of any mentionable event? Put another way, is there a basic underlying structure to experience? Goffman thinks there is: "There is in any given culture a limited set of basic reinterpretation schemas (each, of course, realized in an infinite number of ways) such that the whole set is potentially applica ble to the 'same' event ... these fundamental frameworks themselves form a framework-a framework of frameworks" (p. 68).
Goffman goes on to argue that we might well begin with a single utterance and show it to have a variety of meanings, that these meanings may be grouped into a limited number of separate and fundamentally dif ferent classes, and that these classes may well open the door to the basic structure of experi ence. Indeed, it is the search for some sort of framework of frameworks, or metaschema, that will enable a detailed and dynamic under standing of how contexts actually alter mean ing. And, under Which is to say that choice, selection, disjunction, and discrepancy should be ap proached "As though all the degrees of free dom available to whosoever is about to talk can somehow be mapped out, conceptualized, and ordered, somehow neatly grasped and held, somehow made to submit to the pat terning out effected by analysis" (p. 72).
So, Goffman's program appears to have several components: (I) the grounded as sumption that flexible and laconic talk has a part-for-whole quality so that people typically understand all of what was meant irrespective of what was said; (2) that this is possible be cause interactional contexts constrain mean ing and enable people to appropriately and selectively fill in the blanks; (3) that these infinite acts of typical or unique interpretation (unthinkingly) express the logical possibilities of experience that are a consequence of the operation of a finite set of culturally specific reinterpretation frames; and (4) that the con nection among them is determinate.
Goffman has acquired competence in cer tain aspects of sociolinguistic analysis, ob served shortcomings, and is attempting to supply missing pieces. He is a sociologist whose interests, concerns, and work now speak more to sociolinguists than to sociologists. He shows interest in how indi viduals construct, and reconstruct, interpret and reinterpret, frame and reframe definitions of any "mentionable event," and thereby ap pears to be interested in the subjective, nomi nal experience of individuals; yet, this is but data for more foundational analysis. Actually, he is not in this work interested intrinsically in individuals and their interpretations at all, but in the underlying determinate forms of their experience.
So, Goffman's interest in the forms of talk is as an entry vehicle to the structure(s) of expe rience. He no longer shows interest in the forms of action as an entry vehicle to the structures of reality, unless, of course, he equates talk with action and experience with reality-an arguable if dubious technical ideological convenience.
But, if there are culturally specific basic structures of experience, where are they? Are they buried deep in our collective ancestral experience? Are they out of awareness but conditioned by concrete history? Are they in our language? Are they distributed throughout our kinesic and proxemic systems? Are they everywhere because buried in our evolutional species being? Are they second-order ana lytical constructs adduced from data by a keen and knowledgeable theorist? In whose experi ence and by whose experience is the basic structure of experience to be adduced, dis covered, invented? And, is it possible to dis cover, uncover, invent these basic underlying structures other than through some interpre tive procedure? What then, is the nature of a "mentionable event"? Does it have a nature apart from an individual's interpretation, con struction, or frame? Is it an integral feature of an already ongoing prefigured social organiza tion? Is it an expression of strategic, cultural intentiveness?
Perhaps it is unfair to lay down a barrage of metatheoretical and epistemological ques tions. But in the waning hours of positivism and functionalism, one looks to the foremost practitioners of the craft for guidance. And here the lines between and among structural, formal, and interpretive analysis remain indis tinct.
The Attribution of Gender and Other Traits
Gender Advertisements, by ERVING GOFFMAN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.84 pp. $12.50 cloth. $4.95 paper (Harper & Row).
THOMAS C. HOOD University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Is a picture worth a thousand words? If so, this book is longer than it appears, for it con tains five hundred black-and-white reproduc tions of magazine advertisements, photo graphs, and prints .. Like most of Goffman's work it starts by paying close attention to the small, "taken for granted" aspects of social interactions. Goffman was interested in the ritual aspects of interaction in Relations in Public (1971) . He introduces the idea there that his naturalistic observations have been inspired by ethologists and linguists who are interested in the small, repeated behaviors that occur in nonverbal and verbal interaction. But Goffman goes beyond these sensitizing perspectives into his own perspective on the social order.
Like his other works, Gender Advertise ments is useful in part because it "debunks" contemporary society. Veblen received many references for his analysis of the economic significance of the corset, skirt, and high heeled shoe. Goffman will receive many ref erences for calling our attention to the small symbols that we use to generate and maintain status differences among the sexes. In fact, "heresy of heresies," he suggests:
What the human nature of males and fe males really consists of, then, is a capacity to learn to provide and to read depictions of masculinity and femininity and a willingness to adhere to a schedule for presenting these pictures, and this capacity they have by virtue of being persons, not females or males. One might just as well say there is no gender identity. There is only a schedule for the portrayal of gender [po 8J.
The heretical aspect of this statement has been documented in the literature on sex roles for some time. John Money and others have documented that a genetic male can be raised as a girl and a genetic female raised as a boy. Stage impersonators show us they can per form competently as the opposite gender. Heterosexual transvestites delight in being able to do ordinary activities of the opposite sex in public without detection. Presumably all of this is heretical because "It's not nice to fool Mother Nature," but more is implied.
For twenty-five years Goffman has been telling us that social scientists put too much faith in the idea that human nature is some thing different from social order. Goffman in sists that those things that we thought inher ently imbedded in the nature of individuals are really inferred from hundreds of little actions that we learn to associate with the trait in question. So it is with femininity. What is it that causes us to recognize a female as female and a male as male? These questions, and particularly the former, are the subject matter of this book. The answer is that gender is advertised by many small nonverbal actions that are taken to be typical of women.
Largely the analysis is of the subordinate position of. women in relation to men in con temporary Western societies. Gornick sum marizes many of the salient points in her in troduction, but it is clear that Goffman has provided a quietly documented look at the little ways that women and children are "saved from seriousness" by nonverbal con ventions in our society. In addition to his analysis of how femininity and masculinity are conveyed, Goffman suggests that some of our most enduringly institutionalized hierarchical conventions are bound up in the ways we have been taught to show a bond with the opposite sex. Women and children snuggle and nuzzle. A man wraps a protective arm around the shoulder or provides a shield be hind which the woman or child may take shelter. A woman wears clothes in a playful fashion; a man is costumed appropriately for his purpose. A couplt< in which the woman appears much taller than the man seems inap propriate unless the woman displays higher social status. Women lie down, cant their bodies and heads, bend their knees, strike un serious poses in the sense. that they are dis playing themselves for the purpose of com municating a quality of feeling rather than un dertaking some purposeful venture. Men in advertisements are on their way somewhere. Women in advertisements are on display.
The largest section of pictures deals with what Goffman calls "licensed withdrawal." He argues that women more than men are pictured as withdrawing from traumatic and ordinary situations with gestures that convey remorse, fear, shyness, amusement. These gestures include head and eye aversion, hand covering the mouth,' gazing intently into a mid-distance or at small object, using another person, often a man, as a barrier between themselves and the world.
Goffman chooses unusual data for analysis of the way in which gender behavior is portrayed. It is unusual in that everyone rec ognizes that the models that appear in maga zine advertisements are posed. They are posed to attract our attention but not in such a way that we are alarmed or dismayed by what we see. Magazine advertisements provide a studied conventionality in the poses one finds. This conventionality is the ritual of expression that enables us to take magazine advertise ments as something other than a joke. We glance at the advertisement. We find the be havior typical. We read the pitch ahd pass by, not finding anything out of the ordinary in what we have seen. This unremarkable quality of the advertisement coupled with the attrac tiveness of the model is what Goffman be lieves makes ad vertisements a reasonable source for data. Granted the models are posed, they are posed so as to appear in a scene that we can interpret in a nonhumorous fashion. Thus the photographer and the editor are choosing pictures that they believe to rep resent an acceptable view of a nonverbally expressed relationship or trait.
Goffman's longest essay in the book is "Picture Frames." Persons acquainted with Frame Analysis (1974) and Relations in Public (1971) will find his methodological remarks easy to understand. Goffman argues here that commercial photographs are meaningful be cause they have a realism grounded in the institutionalized arrangements of our daily lives. These scenes are a glimpse of reality that the photographer must arrange in a frame and that we as viewers must be able to inter pret. Such "scenes" differ from the "self worship" found in private pictures designed to reflect a favorable image to the family or indi viduals. Those familiar with Goffman's style will find his careful delineation of conceptual categories in this essay. Private and public pictures are distinguished. "Caught" or "can did" photography described. "Doctored" and "rigged" pictures differentiated. The concepts of keying and fabrication developed in Frame Analysis (1974) become important tools to an alyze the scenes in photographs. Goffman presents a discussion of the personal portrait that becomes a means for refining the concept of "posing." Two quotations:
Commercial posing avowedly transforms a model into almost anyone the advertiser wants to construct an imaginary scene around; private portraiture transforms a model into a decorative representation of himself. . .. Private portraiture, public portraiture for purposes of publicity, caught news shots of national leaders, and even art photography of "interesting looking" faces, all reflect the fundamental fact that their models are not presenting themselves in a personal or social identity not their "own"; that is what underlies our commonsense designation of these pictures as "actually of' their subjects [po 17] . What the advertisement is concerned to de pict is not particular individuals already known, but rather activity which would be recognizable were we to see it performed in real life by persons not known to us person ally [po 19 ].
The book contains much of value to sociologists interested in visual represen tations of social life particularly through the medium of still photography. The field is still in its early stages, but this book and others, like Jon Wagner, Images of Information (1979) , suggest that the still camera and its products may provide both valuable data and teaching tools. In the future I hope to see more communication between recognized photographers who have a "sociological eye" and sociologists who are seeking to transfer their sociological skill to the medium of pho tography.
Some general remarks about the place of this work in Goffman' Others may wish to categorize Goffman as exemplifying the dramaturgic, structuralist, interactionist, or ethnomethodological per spective. I prefer to use the insights in this and other parts of his work as a springboard into the study of the attribution of character.
In an essay read at the 1980 ASA meetings, I echoed Goffman's point in "Where the Action Is" (1%7) that character is the fundamental illusion. The illusion is such for two reasons. First, character is attributed to the individual on the basis of symbolic interpretation of physical appearance. More than gender is in ferred from physical appearance as the con sumers of the Molloy book, Dress for Success (1975) , surely practice and appear to believe. Yet physical appearance is relativtly easy to manipulate. Second, we are encouraged to believe that since our physical bodies are unique ("Who has a set of fingerprints like yours'?"), our characters are unique ("Who has a set of experiences like yours'?"). While our fingerprints may well be unique, the in terpretations we come to make of our own experiences most definitely are conditioned by the language and culture that we share. Char acter is an expression and reflection of the traits considered valuable by a particular soci ety. The evidential process by which traits are attributed to individuals and the way in which an individual acquires and loses a reputation are not well understood. Nevertheless, Goffman's works, including this one, put us on the path to understanding the link between social orders and the characters constructed by adherents of those orders.
Other Literature Cited
